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Abstract. We consider two-player games played over finite state spaces for an infinite
number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves
determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose probability dis-
tributions over moves, rather than single moves. Given a goal (e.g., “reach a target state”),
the question of winning is thus a probabilistic one: “what is the maximal probability of
winning from a given state?”.
On these game structures, two fundamental notions are those of equivalences and met-
rics. Given a set of winning conditions, two states are equivalent if the players can win
the same games with the same probability from both states. Metrics provide a bound on
the difference in the probabilities of winning across states, capturing a quantitative notion
of state “similarity”.
We introduce equivalences and metrics for two-player game structures, and we show
that they characterize the difference in probability of winning games whose goals are
expressed in the quantitative µ-calculus. The quantitative µ-calculus can express a large
set of goals, including reachability, safety, and ω-regular properties. Thus, we claim that
our relations and metrics provide the canonical extensions to games, of the classical notion
of bisimulation for transition systems. We develop our results both for equivalences and
metrics, which generalize bisimulation, and for asymmetrical versions, which generalize
simulation.
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1. Introduction
We consider two-player games played for an infinite number of rounds over finite state
spaces. At each round, the players simultaneously and independently select moves; the
moves then determine a probability distribution over successor states. These games, known
variously as stochastic games [27] or concurrent games [5, 1, 7], generalize many common
structures in computer science, from transition systems, to Markov chains [15] and Markov
decision processes [8]. The games are turn-based if, at each state, at most one of the players
has a choice of moves, and deterministic if the successor state is uniquely determined by
the current state, and by the moves chosen by the players.
It is well-known that in such games with simultaneous moves it is often advantageous for
the players to randomize their moves, so that at each round, they play not a single “pure”
move, but rather, a probability distribution over the available moves. These probability
distributions over moves, called mixed moves [23], lead to various notions of equilibria
[32, 23], such as the equilibrium result expressed by the minimax theorem [32]. Intuitively,
the benefit of playing mixed, rather than pure, moves lies in preventing the adversary from
tailoring a response to the individual move played. Even for simple reachability games, the
use of mixed moves may allow players to win, with probability 1, games that they would
lose (i.e., win with probability 0) if restricted to playing pure moves [5]. With mixed moves,
the question of winning a game with respect to a goal is thus a probabilistic one: what is
the maximal probability a player can be guaranteed of winning, regardless of how the other
player plays? This probability is known, in brief, as the winning probability.
In structures ranging from transition systems to Markov decision processes and games,
a fundamental question is the one of equivalence of states. Given a suitably large class Φ
of properties, containing all properties of interest to the modeler, two states are equivalent
if the same properties hold in both states. For a property ϕ, denote the value of ϕ at s by
ϕ(s): in the case of games, this might represent the maximal probability of a player winning
with respect to a goal expressed by ϕ. Two states s and t are equivalent if ϕ(s) = ϕ(t)
for all ϕ ∈ Φ. For (finite-branching) transition systems, and for the class of properties
Φ expressible in the µ-calculus [17], state equivalence is captured by bisimulation [22]; for
Markov decision processes, it is captured by probabilistic bisimulation [25]. For quantitative
properties, a notion related to equivalence is that of a metric: a metric provides a tight
bound for how much the value of a property can differ at states of the system, and provides
thus a quantitative notion of similarity between states. Given a set Φ of properties, the
metric distance of two states s and t can be defined as supϕ∈Φ |ϕ(s) − ϕ(t)|. Metrics for
Markov decision processes have been studied in [9, 30, 31, 10, 11]. Obviously, the metrics
and relations are connected, in the sense that the relations are the kernels of the metrics (the
pairs of states having metric distance 0). The metrics and relations are at the heart of many
verification techniques, from approximate reasoning (one can substitute states that are close
in the metric) to system reductions (one can collapse equivalent states) to compositional
reasoning and refinement (providing a notion of substitutivity of equivalents).
We introduce metrics and equivalence relations for concurrent games, with respect to
the class of properties Φ expressible in the quantitative µ-calculus [7, 21]. We claim that
these metrics and relations represent the canonical extension of bisimulation to games. We
also introduce asymmetrical versions of these metrics and equivalences, which constitute
the canonical extension of simulation.
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An equivalence relation for deterministic games that are either turn-based, or where
the players are constrained to playing pure moves, has been introduced in [2] and called
alternating bisimulation. Relations and metrics for the general case of concurrent games
have so far proved elusive, with some previous attempts at their definition by a subset of
the authors following a subtly flawed approach [6, 19]. The cause of the difficulty goes to
the heart of the definition of bisimulation. In the definition of bisimulation for transition
systems, for every pair s, t of bisimilar states, we require that if s can go to a state s′,
then t should be able to go to t′, such that s′ and t′ are again bisimilar (we also ask that
s, t have an equivalent predicate valuation). This definition has been extended to Markov
decision processes by requiring that for every mixed move from s, there is a mixed move
from t, such that the moves induce probability distributions over successor states that are
equivalent modulo the underlying bisimulation [25, 24]. Unfortunately, the generalization
of this appealing definition to games fails. It turns out, as we prove in this paper, that
requiring players to be able to replicate probability distributions over successors (modulo
the underlying equivalence) leads to an equivalence that is too fine, and that may fail
to relate states at which the same quantitative µ-calculus formulas hold. We show that
phrasing the definition in terms of distributions over successor states is the wrong approach
for games; rather, the definition should be phrased in terms of expectations of certain
metric-bounded quantities.
Our starting point is a closer look at the definition of metrics for Markov decision
processes. We observe that we can manipulate the definition of metrics given in [31],
obtaining an alternative form, which we call the a priori form, in contrast with the original
form of [31], which we call the a posteriori form. Informally, the a posteriori form is the
traditional definition, phrased in terms of similarity of probability distributions; the a priori
form is instead phrased in terms of expectations. We show that, while on Markov decision
processes these two forms coincide, this is not the case for games; moreover, we show that
it is the a priori form that provides the canonical metrics for games.
We prove that the a priori metric distance between two states s and t of a concurrent
game is equal to supϕ∈Φ |ϕ(s) − ϕ(t)|, where Φ is the set of properties expressible via the
quantitative µ-calculus. This result can be summarized by saying that the quantitative
µ-calculus provides a logical characterization for the a priori metrics, similar to the way the
ordinary µ-calculus provides a logical characterization of bisimulation. Furthermore, we
prove that a priori metrics — and their kernels, the a priori relations — satisfy a reciprocity
property, stating that properties expressed in terms of player 1 and player 2 winning con-
ditions have the same distinguishing power. This property is intimately connected to the
fact that concurrent games, played with mixed moves, are determined for ω-regular goals
[20, 7]: the probability that player 1 achieves a goal ψ is one minus the probability that
player 2 achieves the goal ¬ψ. Reciprocity ensures that there is one, canonical, notion of
game equivalence. This is in contrast to the case of alternating bisimulation of [2], in which
there are distinct player 1 and player 2 versions, as a consequence of the fact that concurrent
games, when played with pure moves, are not determined. The logical characterization and
reciprocity result justify our claim that a priori metrics and relations are the canonical no-
tion of metrics, and equivalence, for concurrent games. Neither the logical characterization
nor the reciprocity result hold for the a posteriori metrics and relations.
While this introduction focused mostly on metrics and equivalence relations, we also
develop results for the asymmetrical versions of these notions, related to simulation.
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2. Games and Goals
We will develop metrics for game structures over a set S of states. We start with some
preliminary definitions. For a finite set A, let Dist(A) = {p : A 7→ [0, 1] |
∑
a∈A p(a) = 1}
denote the set of probability distributions over A. We say that p ∈ Dist(A) is deterministic
if there is a ∈ A such that p(a) = 1.
For a set S, a valuation over S is a function f : S 7→ [0, 1] associating with every
element s ∈ S a value 0 ≤ f(s) ≤ 1; we let F be the set of all valuations. For c ∈ [0, 1], we
denote by c the constant valuation such that c(s) = c at all s ∈ S. We order valuations
pointwise: for f, g ∈ F , we write f ≤ g iff f(s) ≤ g(s) at all s ∈ S; we remark that F ,
under ≤, forms a complete lattice.
Given a, b ∈ IR, we write a ⊔ b = max{a, b}, and a ⊓ b = min{a, b}; we also let
a⊕b = min{1,max{0, a+b}} and a⊖b = max{0,min{1, a−b}}. We extend ⊓,⊔,+,−,⊕,⊖
to valuations by interpreting them in pointwise fashion.
A directed metric is a function d : S2 7→ IR≥0 which satisfies d(s, s) = 0 and d(s, t) ≤
d(s, u) + d(u, t) for all s, t, u ∈ S. We denote by M⊆ S2 7→ IR the space of all metrics; this
space, ordered pointwise, forms a lattice which we indicate with (M,≤). Given a metric
d ∈ M, we denote by d˘ its opposite version, defined by d˘(s, t) = d(t, s) for all s, t ∈ S; we
say that d is symmetrical if d = d˘.
2.1. Game Structures. We assume a fixed, finite set V of observation variables. A (two-
player, concurrent) game structure G = 〈S, [·],Moves ,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉 consists of the following
components [1, 5]:
• A finite set S of states.
• A variable interpretation [·] : V × S 7→ [0, 1], which associates with each variable v ∈ V a
valuation [v].
• A finite set Moves of moves.
• Two move assignments Γ1,Γ2: S 7→ 2
Moves \∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the assignment Γi associates
with each state s ∈ S the nonempty set Γi(s) ⊆ Moves of moves available to player i at
state s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ: S × Moves × Moves 7→ Dist(S), that gives the
probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t) of a transition from s to t when player 1 plays move a1 and
player 2 plays move a2.
At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move a1 ∈ Γ1(s), and simultaneously and inde-
pendently player 2 chooses a move a2 ∈ Γ2(s). The game then proceeds to the succes-
sor state t ∈ S with probability δ(s, a1, a2)(t). We denote by Dest(s, a1, a2) = {t ∈ S |
δ(s, a1, a2)(t) > 0} the set of destination states when actions a1, a2 are chosen at s. The
variables in V naturally induce an equivalence on states: for states s, t, define s ≡ t if for all
v ∈ V we have [v](s) = [v](t). In the following, unless otherwise noted, the definitions refer
to a game structure with components G = 〈S, [·],Moves ,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉. For player i ∈ {1, 2},
we write ∼i = 3 − i for the opponent. We also consider the following subclasses of game
structures.
• Turn-based game structures. A game structure G is turn-based if we can write S as the
disjoint union of two sets: the set S1 of player 1 states, and the set S2 of player 2 states,
such that s ∈ S1 implies |Γ2(s)| = 1, and s ∈ S2 implies |Γ1(s)| = 1, and further, there
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is a special variable turn ∈ V, such that [turn ](s) = 1 iff s ∈ S1, and [turn](s) = 0 iff
s ∈ S2: thus, the variable turn indicates whose turn it is to play at a state.
• Markov decision processes. A game structure G is a Markov decision process (MDP) [8] if
only one of the two players has a choice of moves. For i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that a structure
is an i-MDP if ∀s ∈ S, |Γ∼i(s)| = 1. For MDPs, we omit the (single) move of the player
without a choice of moves, and write δ(s, a) for the transition function.
• Deterministic game structures. A game structure G is deterministic if, for all s ∈ S,
a1 ∈ Moves , and a2 ∈ Moves, there exists a t ∈ S such that δ(s, a1, a2)(t) = 1; we
denote such t by τ(s, a1, a2). We sometimes call probabilistic a general game structure,
to emphasize the fact that it is not necessarily deterministic.
Note that MDPs can be seen as turn-based games by setting [turn] = 1 for 1-MDPs and
[turn ] = 0 for 2-MDPs.
Pure and mixed moves. A mixed move is a probability distribution over the moves
available to a player at a state. We denote by Di(s) = Dist(Γi(s)) the set of mixed moves
available to player i ∈ {1, 2} at s ∈ S. The moves in Moves are called pure moves, in
contrast to mixed moves. We extend the transition function to mixed moves. For s ∈ S
and x1 ∈ D1(s), x2 ∈ D2(s), we write δ(s, x1, x2) for the next-state probability distribution
induced by the mixed moves x1 and x2, defined for all t ∈ S by
δ(s, x1, x2)(t) =
∑
a1∈Γ1(s)
∑
a2∈Γ2(s)
δ(s, a1, a2)(t) x1(a1) x2(a2) .
In the following, we sometimes restrict the moves of the players to pure moves. We identify
a pure move a ∈ Γi(s) available to player i ∈ {1, 2} at a state s with a deterministic
distribution that plays a with probability 1.
The deterministic setting. The deterministic setting is obtained by considering deter-
ministic game structures, with players restricted to playing pure moves.
2.2. Predecessor operators. Given a valuation f ∈ F , a state s ∈ S, and two mixed
moves x1 ∈ D1(s) and x2 ∈ D2(s), we define the expectation of f from s under x1, x2:
E
x1,x2
s (f) =
∑
t∈S
δ(s, x1, x2)(t) f(t) .
For a game structure G, for i ∈ {1, 2} we define the valuation transformer Prei : F 7→ F
by, for all f ∈ F and s ∈ S,
Prei(f)(s) = sup
xi∈Di(s)
inf
x∼i∈D∼i(s)
E
x1,x2
s (f) .
Intuitively, Prei(f)(s) is the maximal expectation player i can achieve of f after one step
from s: this is the classical “one-day” or “next-stage” operator of the theory of repeated
games [12]. We also define a deterministic version of this operator, in which players are
forced to play pure moves:
PreΓi (f)(s) = max
xi∈Γi(s)
min
x∼i∈Γ∼i(s)
E
x1,x2
s (f) .
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2.3. Quantitative µ-calculus. We consider the set of properties expressed by the quanti-
tative µ-calculus (qµ). As discussed in [16, 7, 21], a large set of properties can be encoded
in qµ, spanning from basic properties such as maximal reachability and safety probability,
to the maximal probability of satisfying a general ω-regular specification.
Syntax. The syntax of quantitative µ-calculus is defined with respect to the set of obser-
vation variables V as well as a set MVars of calculus variables, which are distinct from the
observation variables in V. The syntax is given as follows:
ϕ ::= c | v | Z | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ⊕ c | ϕ⊖ c | pre1(ϕ) | pre2(ϕ) | µZ.ϕ | νZ. ϕ
for constants c ∈ [0, 1], observation variables v ∈ V, and calculus variables Z ∈ MVars.
In the formulas µZ.ϕ and νZ. ϕ, we furthermore require that all occurrences of the bound
variable Z in ϕ occur in the scope of an even number of occurrences of the complement
operator ¬. A formula ϕ is closed if every calculus variable Z in ϕ occurs in the scope of
a quantifier µZ or νZ. From now on, with abuse of notation, we denote by qµ the set of
closed formulas of qµ. A formula is a player i formula, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if ϕ does not contain
the pre∼i operator; we denote with qµi the syntactic subset of qµ consisting only of closed
player i formulas. A formula is in positive form if the negation appears only in front of
observation variables, i.e., in the context ¬v; we denote with qµ+ and qµ+i the subsets of
qµ and qµi consisting only of positive formulas.
We remark that the fixpoint operators µ and ν will not be needed to achieve our
results on the logical characterization of game relations. They have been included in the
calculus because they allow the expression of many interesting properties, such as safety,
reachability, and in general, ω-regular properties. The operators ⊕ and ⊖, on the other
hand, are necessary for our results.
Semantics. A variable valuation ξ: MVars 7→ F is a function that maps every variable
Z ∈ MVars to a valuation in F . We write ξ[Z 7→ f ] for the valuation that agrees with ξ
on all variables, except that Z is mapped to f . Given a game structure G and a variable
valuation ξ, every formula ϕ of the quantitative µ-calculus defines a valuation [[ϕ]]Gξ ∈ F
(the superscript G is omitted if the game structure is clear from the context):
[[c]]ξ = c
[[v]]ξ = [v]
[[Z]]ξ = ξ(Z)
[[¬ϕ]]ξ = 1− [[ϕ]]ξ
[[ϕ
{
⊕
⊖
}
c]]ξ = [[ϕ]]ξ
{
⊕
⊖
}
c
[[ϕ1
{
∨
∧
}
ϕ2]]ξ = [[ϕ1]]ξ
{
⊔
⊓
}
[[ϕ2]]ξ
[[prei(ϕ)]]ξ = Prei([[ϕ]]ξ)
[[
{
µ
ν
}
Z.ϕ]]ξ =
{ inf
sup
}
{f ∈ F | f = [[ϕ]]ξ[Z 7→f ]}
where i ∈ {1, 2}. The existence of the fixpoints is guaranteed by the monotonicity and
continuity of all operators and can be computed by Picard iteration [7]. If ϕ is closed, [[ϕ]]ξ
is independent of ξ, and we write simply [[ϕ]].
We also define a deterministic semantics [[·]]Γ for qµ, in which players can select only
pure moves in the operators pre1, pre2. [[·]]
Γ is defined as [[·]], except for the clause
[[prei(ϕ)]]
Γ
ξ = Pre
Γ
i ([[ϕ]]
Γ
ξ ) .
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Example 1. Given a set T ⊆ S, the characteristic valuation T of T is defined by T(s) = 1
if s ∈ T , and T(s) = 0 otherwise. With this notation, the maximal probability with which
player i ∈ {1, 2} can ensure eventually reaching T ⊆ S is given by [[µZ.(T ∨ prei(Z))]], and
the maximal probability with which player i can guarantee staying in T forever is given by
[[νZ.(T ∧ prei(Z))]] (see, e.g., [7]). The first property is called a reachability property, the
second a safety property.
3. Metrics
We are interested in developing a metric on states of a game structure that captures an
approximate notion of equivalence: states close in the metric should yield similar values to
the players for any winning objective. Specifically, we are interested in defining a bisimula-
tion metric [≃g] ∈ M such that for any game structure G and states s, t of G, the following
continuity property holds:
[≃g](s, t) = sup
ϕ∈qµ
|[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)| . (3.1)
In particular, the kernel of the metric, that is, states at distance 0, are equivalent: each
player can get exactly the same value from either state for any objective. Notice that in
defining the metric independent of a player, we are expecting our metrics to be reciprocal,
that is, invariant under a change of player. Reciprocity is expected to hold since the
underlying games we consider are determined —for any game, the value obtained by player
2 is one minus the value obtained by player 1— and yields canonical metrics on games.
Thus, our metrics will generalize equivalence and refinement relations that have been
studied on MDPs and in the deterministic setting. To underline the connection between
classical equivalences and the metrics we develop, we write [s ≃g t] for [≃g](s, t), so that
the desired property of the bisimulation metric can be stated as
[s ≃g t] = sup
ϕ∈qµ
|[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)| .
Metrics of this type have already been developed for Markov decision processes (MDPs)
[30, 10]. Our construction of metrics for games starts from an analysis of these constructions.
3.1. Metrics for MDPs. We consider the case of 1-MDPs; the case for 2-MDPs is sym-
metrical. Throughout this subsection, we fix a 1-MDP 〈S, [·],Moves ,Γ1,Γ2, δ〉. Before we
present the metric correspondent of probabilistic simulation, we first rephrase classical prob-
abilistic (bi)simulation on MDPs [18, 14, 25, 26] as a fixpoint of a relation transformer. As
a first step, we lift relations between states to relations between distributions. Given a
relation R ⊆ S ×S and two distributions p, q ∈ Dist(S), we let p ⊑R q if there is a function
∆ : S × S → [0, 1] such that:
• ∆(s, s′) > 0 implies (s, s′) ∈ R;
• p(s) =
∑
s′∈S ∆(s, s
′) for any s ∈ S;
• q(s′) =
∑
s∈S∆(s, s
′) for any s′ ∈ S.
To rephrase probabilistic simulation, we define the relation transformer F : 2S×S 7→ 2S×S
as follows. For all relations R ⊆ S × S and s, t ∈ S, we let (s, t) ∈ F (R) iff
s ≡ t ∧ ∀x1∈D1(s) . ∃y1∈D1(t) . δ(s, x1) ⊑R δ(t, y1), (3.2)
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for all states s, t ∈ S. Probabilistic simulation is the greatest fixpoint of (3.2); probabilistic
bisimulation is the greatest symmetrical fixpoint of (3.2).
To obtain a metric equivalent of probabilistic simulation, we lift the above fixpoint
from relations (subsets of S2) to metrics (maps S2 7→ IR). First, we define [≡] ∈ M for
all s, t ∈ S by [s ≡ t] = maxv∈V |[v](s) − [v](t)|. Second, we lift (3.2) to metrics, defining
a metric transformer H1MDPpost : M 7→ M. For all d ∈ M, let D(δ(s, x1), δ(t, y1))(d) be the
distribution distance between δ(s, x1) and δ(t, y1) with respect to the metric d. We will
show later how to define such a distribution distance. For s, t ∈ S, we let
H1MDPpost (d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
D(δ(s, x1), δ(t, y1))(d) . (3.3)
In this definition, the ∀ and ∃ of (3.2) have been replaced by sup and inf, respectively.
Since equivalent states should have distance 0, the simulation metric in MDPs is defined as
the least (rather than greatest) fixpoint of (3.3) [30, 10]. Similarly, the bisimulation metric
is defined as the least symmetrical fixpoint of (3.3).
For a distance d ∈ M and two distributions p, q ∈ Dist(S), the distribution distance
D(p, q)(d) is a measure of how much “work” we have to do to make p look like q, given
that moving a unit of probability mass from s ∈ S to t ∈ S has cost d(s, t). More precisely,
D(p, q)(d) is defined via the trans-shipping problem, as the minimum cost of shipping the
distribution p into q, with edge costs d. Thus, D(p, q)(d) is the solution of the following
linear programming (LP) problem over the set of variables {λs,t}s,t∈S :
Minimize
∑
s,t∈S
d(s, t)λs,t
subject to
∑
t∈S
λs,t = p(s),
∑
s∈S
λs,t = q(t), λs,t ≥ 0 .
Equivalently, we can define D(p, q)(d) via the dual of the above LP problem [30]. Given a
metric d ∈ M, let C(d) ⊆ F be the subset of valuations k ∈ F such that k(s)−k(t) ≤ d(s, t)
for all s, t ∈ S. Then the dual formulation is:
Maximize
∑
s∈S
p(s) k(s)−
∑
s∈S
q(s)k(s) (3.4)
subject to k ∈ C(d) .
The constraint C(d) on the valuation k, states that the value of k across states cannot differ
by more than d. This means, intuitively, that k behaves like the valuation of a qµ formula:
as we will see, the logical characterization implies that d is a bound for the difference in
valuation of qµ formulas across states. Indeed, the logical characterization of the metrics
is proved by constructing formulas whose valuation approximate that of the optimal k.
Plugging (3.4) into (3.3), we obtain:
H1MDPpost (d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
sup
k∈C(d)
(
E
x1
s (k)− E
y1
t (k)
)
. (3.5)
We can interpret this definition as follows. State t is trying to simulate state s (this is a
definition of a simulation metric). First, state s chooses a mixed move x1, attempting to
make simulation as hard as possible; then, state t chooses a mixed move y1, trying to match
the effect of x1. Once x1 and y1 have been chosen, the resulting distance between s and
t is equal to the maximal difference in expectation, for moves x1 and y1, of a valuation
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k ∈ C(d). We call the metric transformer H1MDPpost the a posteriori metric transformer: the
valuation k in (3.5) is chosen after the moves x1 and y1 are chosen. We can define an a
priori metric transformer, where k is chosen before x1 and y1:
H1MDPprio (d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
(
E
x1
s (k)− E
y1
t (k)
)
. (3.6)
Intuitively, in the a priori transformer, first a valuation k ∈ C(d) is chosen. Then, state
t must simulate state s with respect to the expectation of k. State s chooses a move x1,
trying to maximize the difference in expectations, and state t chooses a move y1, trying to
minimize it. The distance between s and t is then equal to the difference in the resulting
expectations of k.
Theorem 3.1 below states that for MDPs, a priori and a posteriori simulation metrics
coincide. In the next section, we will see that this is not the case for games.
Theorem 3.1. For all MDPs, H1MDPpost = H
1MDP
prio .
Proof. Consider two states s, t ∈ S, and a metric d ∈ M. We have to prove that
sup
k
sup
x1
inf
y1
[Ex1s (k)− E
y1
t (k)] = sup
x1
inf
y1
sup
k
[Ex1s (k)− E
y1
t (k)] . (3.7)
In the left-hand side, we can exchange the two outer sups. Then, noticing that the
difference in expectation is bi-linear in k and y1 for a fixed x1, that y1 is a probability
distribution, and that k is chosen from a compact convex subset, we apply the generalized
minimax theorem [28] to exchange supk infy1 into infy1 supk, thus obtaining the right-hand
side.
The metrics defined above are logically characterized by qµ. Precisely, let [∼] ∈ M be
the least symmetrical fixpoint of H1MDPprio = H
1MDP
post . Then, Lemma 5.24 and Corollary 5.25
of [10], (originally stated for H1MDPpost ) state that for all states s, t of a 1-MDP, we have
[s ∼ t] = sup
ϕ∈qµ
|[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)| .
3.2. Metrics for Concurrent Games. We now extend the simulation and bisimulation
metrics from MDPs to general game structures. As we shall see, unlike for MDPs, the a
priori and the a posteriori metrics do not coincide over games. In particular, we show that
the a priori formulation satisfies both a tight logical characterization as well as reciprocity
while, perhaps surprisingly, the more natural a posteriori version does not.
A posteriori metrics are defined via the metric transformer H⊑1 :M 7→M as follows,
for all d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S:
H⊑1(d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
sup
y2∈D2(t)
inf
x2∈D2(s)
D(δ(s, x1, x2), δ(t, y1, y2), d)
= [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
sup
y2∈D2(t)
inf
x2∈D2(s)
sup
k∈C(d)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
.
(3.8)
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A priori metrics are defined by bringing the supk outside. Precisely, we define a metric
transformer H1 :M 7→M as follows, for all d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S:
H1(d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
sup
y2∈D2(t)
inf
x2∈D2(s)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
= [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
[
sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
x2∈D2(s)
E
x1,x2
s (k)− sup
y1∈D1(t)
inf
y2∈D2(t)
E
y1,y2
t (k)
]
= [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(t)
)
. (3.9)
First, we show that H1 and H⊑1 are monotonic in the lattice of metrics (M,≤).
Lemma 3.2. The functions H1 and H⊑1 are monotonic in the lattice of metrics (M,≤).
Proof. For d, d′ ∈ M, d ≤ d′ implies C(d) ⊆ C(d′), and hence supk∈C(d)(Pre1(k)(s) −
Pre1(k)(t)) ≤ supk∈C(d′)(Pre1(k)(s) − Pre1(k)(t)). This shows the monotonicity of H1 .
The monotonicity of H⊑1 can be shown in a similar fashion. From d ≤ d
′, reasoning as
before we obtain
sup
k∈C(d)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
≤ sup
k∈C(d′)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
.
The result then follows from the monotonicity of the operators supx1∈D1(s), infy1∈D1(t),
supy2∈D2(t), infx2∈D2(s).
On the basis of this lemma, we can define the least fixpoints of H1 and H⊑1 , which
will yield our game simulation and bisimulation metrics.
Definition 3.3. A priori metrics:
• The a priori simulation metric [1] is the least fixpoint of H1 .
• The a priori bisimulation metric [≃1] is the least symmetrical fixpoint of H1 .
A posteriori metrics:
• The a posteriori game simulation metric [⊑1] is the least fixpoint of H⊑1 .
• The a posteriori game bisimulation metric [∼=1] is the least symmetrical fixpoint of H⊑1 .
By exchanging the roles of the players, we define the metric transformers H2 and H⊑2 ,
and the metrics [2], [≃2], [⊑2], [∼=2].
We note that the a posteriori simulation metric [⊑1] has been introduced in [6, 19]. We
also note that the a posteriori bisimulation metric [∼=i] can be defined as the least fixpoint
of H∼=i :M 7→M, defined for all d ∈ M and i ∈ {1, 2} by
H∼=1(d) = H⊑1(d) ⊔Opp(H⊑1(d)), (3.10)
where Opp(d) = d˘ denotes the opposite of a metric d. Similarly, the a priori bisimulation
metric [≃i] can be defined as the least fixpoint of H≃i : M 7→ M, defined for all d ∈ M
and i ∈ {1, 2} by
H≃1(d) = H1(d) ⊔Opp(H1(d)) . (3.11)
We wish to show that the metrics of Definition 3.3 can be computed via Picard iteration.
To this end, it is necessary to show that the operators H⊑1 and H1 on the lattice (M,≤)
are upper semi-continuous. In fact, a very similar proof shows that the operators are lower
semi-continuous, and thus, continuous; we omit the proof of this more general fact as it is
not required for the desired result about the applicability of Picard iteration.
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Lemma 3.4. The operators H1 and H⊑1 on the lattice (M,≤) are upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Let D ⊆M be an arbitrary set of distances, and let d∗ = supD; note that d∗ exists,
as (M,≤) is a complete lattice.
We first prove the result for H1 . We need to prove that H1(supD) = supd∈DH1(d),
which we abbreviateH1(supD) = supH1(D). In one direction, H1(supD) ≥ supH1(D)
follows from the monotonicity of H1 (Lemma 3.2). In the other direction, we will show
that for all ǫ > 0, there is d ∈ D such that |H1(d
∗) −H1(d)| ≤ ǫ, where for d, d
′ ∈ M,
|d−d′| is the 1-norm distance between d and d′. For convenience, let G(k) ∈M be defined as
G(k)(s, t) = Pre1(k)(s)−Pre1(k)(t), so that we can write H1(d) = [s ≡ t]⊔supk∈C(d)G(k).
Given ǫ > 0, choose d ∈ D such that for all s, t ∈ S, we have d(s, t)/d∗(s, t) ≥ 1 − ǫ/4
if d∗(s, t) > 0, and d(s, t) = 0 if d∗(s, t) = 0. Note that for all k ∈ C(d∗), we have
(1 − ǫ/4)k ∈ C(d) and |k − (1 − ǫ/4)k| ≤ ǫ/4, as |k| ≤ 1. Thus, d ∈ D is such that for
all k ∈ C(d∗), there is k′ ∈ C(d) with |k − k′| ≤ ǫ/4. In other words, d is such that the
Hausdorff distance between C(d∗) and C(d) is at most ǫ/4. We now prove that for this d,
we have
| sup
k∈C(d∗)
G(k) − sup
k∈C(d)
G(k)| ≤ ǫ . (3.12)
In fact, let k∗ ∈ C(d∗) be such that
|G(k∗)− sup
k∈C(d∗)
G(k)| ≤ ǫ/2 . (3.13)
and let k′ ∈ C(d) be such that |k∗ − k′| ≤ ǫ/4. For s, t ∈ S, we have by definition
G(k∗)(s, t) = Pre1(k
∗)(s)− Pre1(k
∗)(t); let
x1(s) = arg sup
x∈D1(s)
inf
y∈D2(s)
E
x,y
s (k
∗) .
By employing x1(s) at all s ∈ S, player 1 can guarantee
|G(k′)(s, t)−G(k∗)(s, t)| ≤ ǫ/2,
which together with (3.13) leads to (3.12). In turn, (3.12) yields the result.
We can prove the result forH⊑1 following a similar argument. Precisely, in one direction,
H⊑1(supD) ≥ supH⊑1(D) follows from the monotonicity of H⊑1 (Lemma 3.2). In the other
direction, we will show that for all ǫ > 0, there is d ∈ D such that |H⊑1(d
∗)−H⊑1(d)| ≤ ǫ,
where for d, d′ ∈M, |d− d′| is the 1-norm distance between d and d′. Again, let d be such
that the Hausdorff distance between C(d∗) and C(d) is at most ǫ/2. For such a d, we have
that for all s, t ∈ S, and x1 ∈ D1(s), y1 ∈ D1(t), x2 ∈ D2(s), y2 ∈ D2(t),∣∣∣ sup
k∈C(d∗)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
− sup
k∈C(d)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k) − E
y1,y2
t (k)
)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ,
and this leads easily to the result.
This result implies that we can compute [1] as the fixpoint of H1 via Picard iteration;
we denote by dn = H
n
1
(0) the n-iterate of this. Similarly, we can compute [⊑1] as the
fixpoint of H⊑1 via Picard iteration.
Theorem 3.5. The following assertions hold, for i ∈ {1, 2}:
(1) Let d0 = d
′
0 = 0, and for n ≥ 0, let
dn+1 = Hi(dn) and d
′
n+1 = H⊑i(d
′
n) . (3.14)
We have limn→∞ dn = [i] and limn→∞ d
′
n = [⊑i].
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(2) Let b0 = b
′
0 = 0, and for n ≥ 0, let
bn+1 = Hi(bn) ⊔Opp(Hi(bn)) and b
′
n+1 = H⊑i(b
′
n) ⊔Opp(H⊑i(b
′
n)) . (3.15)
We have limn→∞ bn = [≃i] and limn→∞ b
′
n = [
∼=i].
Proof. The statements follow from the definitions of the metrics, and from Lemmas 3.2
and 3.4.
We now show some basic properties of these metrics. First, we show that the a priori
fixpoints give a (directed) metric, i.e., they are non-negative and satisfy the triangle inequal-
ity. We also prove that the a priori and a posteriori metrics are distinct. We then focus on
the a priori metrics, and show, through our results, that they are the natural metrics for
concurrent games.
Theorem 3.6. For all game structures G, and all states s, t, u of G, we have,
(1) [s 1 t] ≥ 0 and [s 1 u] ≤ [s 1 t] + [t 1 u].
(2) [s ⊑1 t] ≥ 0 and [s ⊑1 u] ≤ [s ⊑1 t] + [t ⊑1 u].
Proof. We prove the following statement: if d ∈M is a directed metric, then:
(1) H1(d) is a directed metric;
(2) H⊑1(d) is a directed metric.
The theorem then follows by induction on the Picard iteration with which the a priori and
a posteriori metrics can be computed (Theorem 3.5). We prove the result first for the a
priori metric.
First, from d′ = H1(d) and [≡] ≥ 0, we immediately have d
′ ≥ 0 (where inequalities
are interpreted in pointwise fashion).
To prove the triangle inequality, we observe that [s ≡ t] + [t ≡ u] ≥ [s ≡ u] for all
s, t, u ∈ S. Also,
sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(t)
)
+ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(t) − Pre1(k)(u)
)
≥ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s) − Pre1(k)(t) + Pre1(k)(t)− Pre1(k)(u)
)
= sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(u)
)
.
Thus, we obtain
H1(d)(s, t) +H1(d)(t, u)
=
(
[s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s) − Pre1(k)(t)
))
+
(
[t ≡ u] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(t)− Pre1(k)(u)
))
≥
(
[s ≡ u] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(u)
))
= H1(d)(s, u),
leading to the result.
For the a posteriori metric, let d′ = H⊑1(d); again, we can prove d
′ ≥ 0 as in the a priori
case. To prove the triangle inequality for d′, for s, t ∈ S, and for distributions x1 ∈ D1(s)
and y1 ∈ D1(t), it is convenient to let
G(x1, y1)(s, t) = sup
y2∈D2(t)
inf
x2∈D2(s)
sup
k∈C(d)
(
E
x1,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
,
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With this notation, for s, t, u ∈ S, we have
H⊑1(d)(s, u) = [s ≡ u] ⊔ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
z1∈D1(u)
G(x1, z1)(s, u) . (3.16)
Intuitively, the quantity G(x1, z1)(s, u) is the distance between s and u computed in the
2-MDP obtained when player 1 plays x1 at s and z1 at u. As a consequence of Theorem 3.1
(interpreted over 2-MDPs), and of the previous proof for the a-priori case, we have that
G(x1, z1)(s, u) ≤ G(x1, y1)(s, t) +G(y1, z1)(t, u) . (3.17)
for all x1 ∈ D1(s), y1 ∈ D1(t), and z1 ∈ D1(u). This observation will be useful in the
following.
For any ǫ > 0, let x∗1 realize the sup in (3.16) within ǫ, that is,
inf
z1∈D1(u)
G(x∗1, z1)(s, u) ≥ sup
x1∈D1(s)
inf
z1∈D1(u)
G(x1, z1)(s, u)− ǫ, (3.18)
and let z∗1 realize the inf of the left-hand side of (3.18) also within ǫ. Intuitively, x
∗
1 is the
player-1 distribution at s that is hardest to imitate from u, and z∗1 is the best imitation of x
∗
1
available at u. In the same fashion, let y∗1 realize the inf within ǫ in infy1∈D1(t)G(x
∗
1, y1)(s, t),
and let z′1 realize the inf within ǫ in infz1∈D1(u)G(y
∗
1 , z1)(t, u). In intuitive terms, y
∗
1 is the
imitator of x∗1 in t, and z
′
1 is the imitator of y
∗
1 in u.
We consider two cases. If [s ≡ u] = 1, then we are sure that the triangle inequality
d′(s, u) ≤ d′(s, t) + d′(t, u), (3.19)
holds. Otherwise, note that
d′(s, u) ≤ G(x∗1, z
∗
1)(s, u) + 2ǫ . (3.20)
Since x∗1 is not necessarily the distribution at s that is hardest to imitate from t, and since
y∗1 is not necessarily the distribution at t that is hardest to imitate from u, we also have:
d′(s, t) ≥ G(x∗1, y
∗
1)(s, t) − ǫ d
′(t, u) ≥ G(y∗1 , z
′
1)(t, u) − ǫ . (3.21)
Since the triangle inequality holds for MDPs, as stated by (3.17), we have
G(x∗1, z
′
1)(s, u) ≤ G(x
∗
1, y
∗
1)(s, t) +G(y
∗
1 , z
′
1)(t, u) ≤ d
′(s, t) + d′(t, u) + 2ǫ . (3.22)
Since z∗1 is the best imitator of x
∗
1 at u, we also have
G(x∗1, z
∗
1)(s, u)− ǫ ≤ G(x
∗
1, z
′
1)(s, u), (3.23)
which together with (3.22) yields
G(x∗1, z
∗
1)(s, u) ≤ d
′(s, t) + d′(t, u) + 3ǫ . (3.24)
From the choice of x∗1, this finally leads to
d′(s, u) ≤ d′(s, t) + d′(t, u) + 5ǫ,
for all ǫ > 0, which yields the desired triangle inequality (3.19).
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δ(t, ∗, ∗)(w) f g
b 1/9 5/9
c 4/9 8/9
δ(t, ∗, ∗)(u) f g
b 8/9 4/9
c 5/9 1/9
δ(s, ∗, ∗)(w) f g
a 1/3 2/3
δ(s, ∗, ∗)(u) f g
a 2/3 1/3
(*, *, *)(u)δ
(*, *, *)(w)δ
8/9 1/34/95/9
0 1/9 1/3 4/9 5/9 2/3 8/9
2/31 01/9
1
b,f
a,f a,g
c,f b,g c,g
Figure 1: A game that shows that the a priori and the a posteriori metrics may not coincide.
The tables above show the transition probabilities from states t and s to states
w and u for pure moves of the two players. The row player is player 1 and the
column player is player 2. The line below is the two dimensional probability
simplex that shows the transition probabilities induced by convex combinations
of pure moves of the two players.
3.3. A priori and a posteriori metrics are distinct. First, we show that a priori and
a posteriori metrics are distinct in general: the a priori metric never exceeds the a posteriori
one, and there are concurrent games where it is strictly smaller. Intuitively, this can be
explained as follows. Simulation entails trying to simulate the expectation of a valuation k,
as we see from (3.8), (3.9). It is easier to simulate a state s from a state t if the valuation
is known in advance, as in a priori metrics (3.9), than if the valuation k is chosen after all
the moves have been chosen, as in a posteriori metrics (3.8).
As a special case, we shall see that equality holds for turn-based game structures, in
addition to MDPs as we have seen in the previous subsection.
Theorem 3.7. The following assertions hold.
(1) For all game structures G, and for all states s, t of G, we have [s 1 t] ≤ [s ⊑1 t].
(2) There is a game structure G, and states s, t of G, such that [s 1 t] = 0 and [s ⊑1 t] > 0.
(3) For all turn-based game structures, we have [1] = [⊑1].
Proof. The first assertion is a consequence of the fact that, for all functions f : IR2 7→ IR,
we have supx infy f(x, y) ≤ infy supx f(x, y). By repeated applications of this, we can show
that, for all d ∈ M, we have H(d) ≤ H⊑(d) (with pointwise ordering). The result then
follows from the monotonicity of H and H⊑.
For the second assertion, we give an example where a priori distances are strictly less
than a posteriori distances. Consider a game with states S = {s, t, u, w}. States u and w
are sink states with [u ≡ w] = 1; states s and t are such that [s ≡ t] = 0. At states s and
t, player 2 has moves {f, g}. Player-1 has a single move {a} at state s, and moves {b, c} at
state t. The moves from s and t lead to u and w with transition probabilities indicated in
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Figure 1. In the figure, the point b, f indicates the probability of going to u and w when the
move pair (b, f) is played, with δ(s, b, f)(u) + δ(s, b, f)(w) = 1; similarly for the other move
pairs. The thick line segment between the points a, f and a, g represents the transition
probabilities arising when player 1 plays move a, and player 2 plays a mixed move (a mix
of f and g).
We show that, in this game, we have [s ⊑1 t] > 0. Consider the metric d where
d(u,w) = 1 (recall that [u ≡ w] = 1, and note the other distances do not matter, since u,
w are the only two destinations). We need to show
∀y1 ∈ D1(t).∃y2 ∈ D2(t).∀x2 ∈ D2(s).∃k ∈ C(d).
(
E
a,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
> 0 . (3.25)
Consider any mixed move y1 = αb+ (1−α)c, where b, c are the moves available to player 1
at t, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. If α ≥ 12 , choose move f from t as y2, and choose k(w) = 1, k(u) = 0.
Otherwise, choose move g from t as y2, and choose k(w) = 0, k(u) = 1. With these
choices, the transition probability δ(t, y1, y2) will fall outside of the segment [(a, f), (a, g)]
in Figure 1. Thus, with the choice of k above, we ensure that the difference in (3.25) is
always positive.
To show that in the game we have [s 1 t] = 0, it suffices to show (given that [s 1
t] ≥ 0) that
∀k ∈ C(d).∃y1 ∈ D1(t).∀y2 ∈ D2(t).∃x2 ∈ D2(s).
(
E
a,x2
s (k)− E
y1,y2
t (k)
)
≤ 0 .
If k(u) = k(w), the result is immediate. Assume otherwise, that k(u) < k(w), and choose
y1 = c. For every y2, the distribution over successor states (and of k-expectations) will be in
the interval [(c, f), (c, g)] in Figure 1. By choosing x2 = f , we have that E
a,f
s (k) < E
c,y2
t (k)
for all y2 ∈ D2(t), leading to the result. Similarly if k(u) > k(w), by choosing y1 = b,
the distribution over successor states (and of k-expectations) will now be in the interval
[(b, f), (b, g)]. By choosing x2 = g, we have that E
a,g
s (k) < E
b,y2
t (k) for all y2 ∈ D2(t), again
leading to the result.
The last assertion of the theorem is proved in the same way as Theorem 3.1.
3.4. Reciprocity of a priori metric. The previous theorem establishes that the a priori
and a posteriori metrics are in general distinct. We now prove that it is the a priori metric,
rather than the a posteriori one, that enjoys reciprocity, and that provides a (quantitative)
logical characterization of qµ. We begin by considering reciprocity.
Theorem 3.8. The following assertions hold.
(1) For all game structures G, we have [1] = [2], and [≃1] = [≃2].
(2) There is a concurrent game structure G, with states s and t, where [⊑1] 6= [⊒2].
(3) There is a concurrent game structure G, with states s and t, where [∼=1] 6= [∼=2].
Proof. For the first assertion, it suffices to show that, for all d ∈ M, and states s, t ∈ S, we
have H1(d)(s, t) = H2(d˘)(t, s). We proceed as follows:
sup
k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(t)
)
(3.26)
= sup
k∈C(d)
(
−Pre2(1− k)(s) + Pre2(1− k)(t)
)
(3.27)
= sup
k∈C(d˘)
(
Pre2(k)(t) − Pre2(k)(s)
)
. (3.28)
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The step from (3.26) to (3.27) uses Pre1(k)(s) = 1 − Pre2(1 − k)(s) [32, 7], and the step
from (3.27) to (3.28) uses the change of variables k → 1− k.
For the second assertion, consider again the game of Figure 1. We will show that
[t ⊑2 s] = 0. Together with [s ⊑1 t] > 0, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.7, this leads
to the result. To obtain the result, we will prove that for all d, we have:
∀y2 ∈ D2(t).∃x2 ∈ D2(s).∃y1 ∈ D1(t).∀k ∈ C(d).
(
E
y2,y1
t (k)− E
x2,a
s (k)
)
= 0 .
where we have used the fact that player 1 at s plays x1 = a. Any mixed move y2 ∈ D2(t)
can be written as y2 = αf + (1− α)g for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Choose y1 = αc+ (1− α)b, and
x2 = α
(2
3
f +
1
3
g
)
+ (1− α)
(1
3
f +
2
3
g
)
.
Under this choice of mixed moves, we have:
δ(t, y1, y2)(w) =
4
9
α2 + α(1 − α) +
5
9
(1− α)2 =
5
9
−
1
9
α
δ(s, x1, x2)(w) = α
(2
3
·
1
3
+
1
3
·
2
3
)
+ (1− α)
(2
3
·
2
3
+
1
3
·
1
3
)
=
5
9
−
1
9
α .
As the probabilities of transitions to w are equal from t and s, we obtain that for all
k ∈ C(d), we have Ey2,y1t (k)− E
x2,a
s (k) = 0, as desired.
For the third assertion, we consider a modified version of the game depicted in Figure 1,
obtained by adding two new moves to player 2 at state t, namely f ′ and g′. We define the
transition probabilities of these new moves by
δ(t, ∗, f ′) = δ(s, a, f) δ(t, ∗, g′) = δ(s, a, g) .
To prove [s ⊑1 t] > 0, we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, noting that we can
choose y2 as in that proof (this is possible, as player 2 at t has more moves available in the
modified game). This leads to [s ∼=1 t] > 0.
To show that [s ∼=2 t] = 0, given the transition structure of the game, it suffices to show
that [s ⊑2 t] = 0 and [t ⊑2 s] = 0. To show that [s ⊑2 t] = 0, we show that for all d, we
have:
∀x2 ∈ D2(s).∃y2 ∈ D2(t).∀y1 ∈ D1(t).∀k ∈ C(d).
(
E
x2,a
s (k)− E
y2,y1
t (k)
)
= 0 .
We can write any mixed move x2 ∈ D2(s) as x2 = αf + (1 − α)g. We can then choose
y2 = αf
′ + (1− α)g′, and since at t under f ′, g′ the transition probabilities do not depend
on the mixed move y1 chosen by player 1, we have that the transition probabilities from s
and t match for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
To show that [t ⊑2 s] = 0, we need to show that:
∀y2 ∈ D2(t).∃x2 ∈ D2(s).∃y1 ∈ D1(t).∀k ∈ C(d).
(
E
y2,y1
t (k)− E
x2,a
s (k)
)
= 0 .
Any mixed move y2 ∈ D2(t) can be written as
y2 = γ
[
αf + (1− α)g
]
+ (1− γ)
[
βf ′ + (1− β)g′
]
,
for some α, β, γ ∈ [0, 1]. We choose x2 and y1 as follows:
x2 = αγ
[2
3
f +
1
3
g
]
+ (1− α)γ
[1
3
f +
2
3
g
]
+ (1− γ)
[
βf + (1− β)g
]
y1 = αc+ (1− α)b .
With these mixed moves, we have δ(s, a, x2) = δ(t, y1, y2), leading to the result.
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As a consequence of this theorem, we write [≃g] in place of [≃1] = [≃2], to emphasize that
the player 1 and player 2 versions of game equivalence metrics coincide.
3.5. Logical characterization of a priori metric. We now prove that qµ provides a
logical characterization for the a priori metrics. We first state and prove two lemmas that
lead to the desired result. The proof of the lemmas use ideas from [19] and [10]. We recall
from Theorem 3.5 that we can compute [1] via Picard iteration, with dn = H
n
1
(0) being
the n-iterate.
We prove the existence of a logical characterization via a sequence of the following two
lemmas. The first lemma proves that a priori metrics provide a bound for the difference in
value of qµ-formulas.
Lemma 3.9. The following assertions hold for all game structures.
(1) For all ϕ ∈ qµ+1 , and for all s, t ∈ S, we have [[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t) ≤ [s 1 t].
(2) For all ϕ ∈ qµ, and for all s, t ∈ S, we have |[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)| ≤ [s ≃g t].
Proof. We prove the first assertion. The proof is by induction on the structure of a (possibly
open) formula ϕ ∈ qµ+1 . Call a variable valuation ξ bounded if, for all variables Z ∈ MVars
and states s, t, we have that ξ(Z)(s) − ξ(Z)(t) ≤ [s 1 t]. We prove by induction that for
all s, t ∈ S, for all bounded variable valuations ξ, we have [[ϕ]]ξ(s)− [[ϕ]]ξ(t) ≤ [s 1 t]. For
clarity, we sometimes omit writing the variable valuation ξ.
The base case for constants is trivial, and the case for observation variables follows
since [s ≡ t] ≤ [s 1 t]. The case for variables Z ∈ MVars follows from the assumption of
bounded variable valuations. For ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, assume the induction hypothesis for ϕ1, ϕ2, and
note that
(
[[ϕ1]](s) ⊔ [[ϕ2]](s)
)
−
(
[[ϕ1]](t) ⊔ [[ϕ2]](t)
)
≤
(
[[ϕ1]](s)− [[ϕ1]](t)
)
⊔
(
[[ϕ2]](s)− [[ϕ2]](t)
)
≤ [s 1 t] .
The proof for ∧ is similar. For ϕ1 ⊕ c and ϕ1 ⊖ c, we have by induction hypothesis that
[[ϕ1]](s)− [[ϕ1]](t) ≤ [s 1 t], and so the “shifted versions” also satisfy the same bound.
For the induction step for pre1, assume the induction hypothesis for ϕ, and note that
we can choose k ∈ C([1]) such that k(s) = [[ϕ]](s) at all s ∈ S. We have, for all s, t ∈ S,
[[pre1(ϕ)]](s) − [[pre1(ϕ)]](t) ≤ sup
k∈C([1])
(
Pre1(k)(s) − Pre1(k)(t)
)
≤ [s 1 t] . (3.29)
where the last inequality follows by noting that [1] is a fixpoint of H1 .
The proof for the fixpoint operators is performed by considering their Picard iterates.
We consider the case µZ.ϕ, the proof for νZ.ϕ is similar. Let ξ be a bounded variable
valuation. Then, the variable valuation ξ0 = ξ[Z 7→ 0] is also bounded, and by induction
hypothesis, the formula ϕ when evaluated in the variable valuation ξ0 satisfies
[[ϕ]]ξ0(s)− [[ϕ]]ξ0(t) ≤ [s 1 t] . (3.30)
Now consider the variable valuation ξ1 = ξ[Z 7→ [[ϕ]]ξ0 ]. From Equation (3.30), we get that ξ1
is bounded, and again, by induction hypothesis, we have that [[ϕ]]ξ1(s)− [[ϕ]]ξ1(t) ≤ [s 1 t].
In general, for k ≥ 0, consider the variable valuation ξk+1 = ξ[Z 7→ [[ϕ]]ξk ]. By the above
argument, each variable valuation ξk is bounded, and so for every k ≥ 0, we have
[[ϕ]]ξk (s)− [[ϕ]]ξk (t) ≤ [s 1 t] . (3.31)
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Taking the limit, as k →∞, we have that
lim
k→∞
([[ϕ]]ξk (s)− [[ϕ]]ξk(t)) = [[µZ.ϕ]]ξ(s)− [[µZ.ϕ]]ξ(t) ≤ [s 1 t] . (3.32)
The proof of the second assertion can be done along the same lines, using the symmetry
of ≃g. The proof is again by induction on the structure of the formula. In particular, (3.29)
can be proved for either player: for n ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, 2},
[[prei(ϕ)]](s) − [[prei(ϕ)]](t) ≤ sup
k∈C([≃g])
(
Prei(k)(s)− Prei(k)(t)
)
≤ [s ≃g t] .
Negation can be dealt with by noting that [[¬ϕ]](s)− [[¬ϕ(t)]] = [[ϕ]](t)− [[ϕ(s)]], and by using
the symmetry of ≃g; the other cases are similar.
The second lemma states that the qµ formulas can attain the distance computed by
the simulation metric.
Lemma 3.10. The following assertions hold for all game structures G, and for all states
s, t of G.
[s 1 t] ≤ sup
ϕ∈qµ+
1
([[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t))
[s ≃g t] ≤ sup
ϕ∈qµ
|[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)|
Proof. We show by induction on n that dn(s, t) ≤ supϕ∈qµ([[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)). The base case
is trivial. For the induction step, the distance is:
di+1(s, t) = sup
k∈C(di)
(
Pre1(k)(s)− Pre1(k)(t)
)
. (3.33)
The challenge is to show that, for all s, t ∈ S, we can construct a formula ψst that witnesses
the distance within an arbitrary ε > 0:
di+1(s, t)− ε ≤ [[ψst]](s)− [[ψst]](t) . (3.34)
To this end, let k⋆ be the value of k that realizes the sup in (3.33) within ε/4. By induction
hypothesis, for each pair of states s′ and t′ we can choose ϕ′s′t′ such that
di(s
′, t′)− ε/4 ≤ [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)− [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](t
′) . (3.35)
Let ϕs′t′ be a shifted version of ϕ
′
s′t′ , such that ϕs′t′(s
′) = k⋆(s′):
ϕs′t′ = ϕ
′
s′t′ ⊕ (k
⋆(s′)− [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)) . (3.36)
We now prove that:
[[ϕs′t′ ]](s
′) = k⋆(s′) (3.37)
[[ϕs′t′ ]](t
′) ≤ k⋆(t′) + ε/4 . (3.38)
Equality (3.37) is immediate from (3.36). We prove (3.38) as follows. We can rewrite (3.35)
as
[[ϕ′s′t′ ]](t
′)− ε/4 ≤ [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)− di(s
′, t′) . (3.39)
Since k⋆ ∈ C(di), we have k
⋆(s′)− k⋆(t′) ≤ di(s
′, t′), or
k⋆(t′)− k⋆(s′) ≥ −di(s
′, t′) . (3.40)
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Plugging this relation into (3.39), we obtain
[[ϕ′s′t′ ]](t
′)− ε/4 ≤ [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′) + k⋆(t′)− k⋆(s′) . (3.41)
Plugging this relation into (3.36) evaluated at t′, we obtain
[[ϕs′t′ ]](t
′)− ε/4 ≤ [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′) + k⋆(t′)− k⋆(s′)⊕
(
k⋆(s′)− [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)
)
,
or
[[ϕs′t′ ]](t
′)− ε/4 ≤ k⋆(t′)−
(
k⋆(s′)− [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)
)
⊕
(
k⋆(s′)− [[ϕ′s′t′ ]](s
′)
)
≤ k⋆(t′),
which proves (3.38). Define now ϕs′ =
∧
t′ ϕs′t′ . From (3.37) and (3.38) we have
[[ϕs′ ]](s
′) = k⋆(s′) (3.42)
[[ϕs′ ]](t
′) ≤ k⋆(t′) + ε/4 . (3.43)
Define then ϕ =
∨
s′ ϕs′ . From (3.42), (3.43), we have that
k⋆(s′) ≤ [[ϕ]](s′) ≤ k⋆(s′) + ε/4 . (3.44)
for all s′ ∈ S. As formula ψst, we propose thus to take the formula pre(ϕ). From (3.44), we
have that |[[ψst]](s) − Pre1(k
⋆)(s)| ≤ ε/4, and similarly, |[[ψst]](t) − Pre1(k
⋆)(t)| ≤ ε/4. By
comparison with (3.33), and by the fact that k⋆ realizes the sup within ε/4, we finally have
(3.34), as desired.
From these two lemmas, we can conclude that [[qµ]] provides a logical characterization
for the a priori metrics, as stated by the next theorem.
Theorem 3.11. The following assertions hold for all game structures G, and for all states
s, t of G:
[s 1 t] = sup
ϕ∈qµ+
1
([[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)) [s ≃g t] = sup
ϕ∈qµ
|[[ϕ]](s) − [[ϕ]](t)|
We note that, due to Theorem 3.7, an analogous result does not hold for the a posteriori
metrics. Together with the lack of reciprocity of the a posteriori metrics, this is a strong
indication that the a priori metrics, and not the a posteriori ones, are the “natural” metrics
on concurrent games.
Our metrics are not characterized by the probabilistic temporal logic PCTL [13, 3]. In
fact, the values of PCTL formulas can change from true to false when certain probabilities
cross given thresholds, so that PCTL formulas can have different boolean values on games
that are very close in transition probabilities, and hence, very close in our metric. Quan-
titative metrics such as the ones developed in this paper are suited to quantitative-valued
formulas, such as those of qµ.
3.6. The Kernel. The kernel of the metric [≃g] defines an equivalence relation ≃g on the
states of a game structure: s ≃g t iff [s ≃g t] = 0. We call this the game bisimulation
relation. Notice that by the reciprocity property of ≃g, the game bisimulation relation is
canonical: ≃1 = ≃2 = ≃g. Similarly, we define the game simulation preorder s 1 t as the
kernel of the directed metric [1], that is, s 1 t iff [s 1 t] = 0. Alternatively, it is possible
to define 1 and ≃g directly. Given a relation R ⊆ S × S, let B(R) ⊆ F consist of all
valuations k ∈ F such that, for all s, t ∈ S, if sRt then k(s) ≤ k(t). We have the following
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Theorem 3.12. Given a game structure G, the relation 1 (resp. ≃1) can be characterized
as the largest (resp. largest symmetrical) relation R such that, for all states s, t with sRt,
we have s ≡ t and
∀k ∈ B(R).∀x1 ∈ D1(s).∃y1 ∈ D1(t).∀y2 ∈ D2(t).∃x2 ∈ D2(s).
(
E
y1,y2
t (k) ≥ E
x1,x2
s (k)
)
.
(3.45)
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the computation of the fixpoint relation R. We
first present the case for 1. Call Rn the n-th iterate of the simulation relation R, and
let dn be the n-th iterate of [1], as in Theorem 3.5. We prove by induction that, for all
states s, t ∈ S, we have sRnt iff dn(s, t) = 0. We define d0(s, t) = [s ≡ t]. The base case
is then immediate because sR0t iff d0(s, t) = 0. Consider the induction step, for n ≥ 0,
and consider any states s, t ∈ S. Assume first that dn+1(s, t) > 0: then, it is easy to show
that we can find a value for k in (3.45) that witnesses (s, t) 6∈ Rn+1, since the constraints
on k due to B(Rn) are weaker than those due to C(dn). Conversely, assume that there is
a k ∈ B(Rn) that witnesses (s, t) 6∈ Rn+1. Then, by scaling all k values so that they are
all smaller than the smallest non-zero value of dn(s
′, t′) for any s′, t′ ∈ S, we can find a
k′ ∈ C(dn) which also witnesses dn+1(s, t) > 0, as required.
The case for ≃g is analogous, due to the similarity of the Picard iterations (3.14) for
1 and (3.15) for ≃g.
We note that the above theorem allows the computation of ≃g via a partition-refinement
scheme. From the logical characterization theorem, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.13. For any game structure G and states s, t of G, we have s ≃g t iff [[ϕ]](s) =
[[ϕ]](t) holds for every ϕ ∈ qµ and s 1 t iff [[ϕ]](s) ≤ [[ϕ]](t) holds for every ϕ ∈ qµ
+
1 .
3.7. Relation between Game Metrics and (Bi-)simulation Metrics. The a priori
metrics assume an adversarial relationship between the players. We show that, on turn-
based games, the a priori bisimulation metric coincides with the classical bisimulation metric
where the players cooperate.
We define such “cooperative” simulation and bisimulation metrics [12] and [≃12] as
the metric analog of classical (bi)simulation [22, 25]. We define the metric transformers
H12 :M 7→M and H≃12 :M 7→M, for all metrics d ∈ M and s, t ∈ S, by:
H12(d)(s, t) = [s ≡ t] ⊔ sup
k∈C(d)
sup
x1∈D1(s)
sup
x2∈D2(s)
inf
y2∈D2(t)
inf
y1∈D1(t)
{Ex1,x2s (k) − E
y1,y2
t (k)} .
H≃12(d)(s, t) = H12(d)(s, t) ⊔H12(d)(t, s) .
The metrics [12] and [≃12] are defined as the least fixed points of H12 and H≃12 re-
spectively. The kernel of these metrics define the classical probabilistic simulation and
bisimulation relations.
Theorem 3.14. The following assertions hold.
(1) On turn-based game structures, [≃g] = [≃12].
(2) There is a deterministic game structure G and states s, t in G such that [s ≃g t] >
[s ≃12 t].
(3) There is a deterministic game structure G and states s, t in G such that [s ≃g t] <
[s ≃12 t].
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Figure 2: [s ≃g t] =
1
2 and [s ≃12 t] = 0
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Figure 3: [s ≃g t] = 0 but [s ≃12 t] = 1.
Proof. For the first part, since we have turn-based games, only one player has a choice of
moves at each state. We say that a state s belongs to player i ∈ {1, 2} if player ∼i has
only one move at s. First, notice that due to the presence of the variable turn, the metric
distance between states belonging to different players is always 1, for all the metrics we
consider. Thus, we focus on the metric distances between states belonging to the same
player. Consider two player 1 states s, t ∈ S. From the definitions of H1 and H12 , for
d ∈ M, by dropping the moves of player 2, it is easy to see that H1(d) = H12(d), and
H≃g(d) = H≃12(d). Since this holds for any d ∈ M, it holds for the fixpoints, [≃g] and
[≃12].
The second part is proved by the game in Figure 2, where [s ≡ t] = 0 and [u ≡ v] = 1.
The latter yields [u ≃g v] = 1. Since player 1 has no choice of moves at state s, the
maximum probability with which player 1 can guarantee a transition to either state u or
state v is 0. But from state t, by playing moves a, b with probability 12 each, player 1 can
guarantee reaching states u and v with probability 12 , which implies that over all k ∈ C(d),
given that d(u, v) = 1 from [u ≃g v] = 1, the maximum k expectation that player 1 can
guarantee is 12 . Therefore [s ≃g t] =
1
2 . But if player 2 co-operates, then [s ≃12 t] = 0.
The third part is proved by the game in Figure 3 where again [s ≡ t] = 0 and [u ≡ v] = 1.
Since the players don’t have any moves to transition to state v from state t, [s ≃12 t] = 1,
whereas [s ≃g t] = 0.
If we consider Markov decision processes (MDPs), we have that on i-MDPs, the metric
i coincides with 12, since player ∼i has no moves, for i ∈ {1, 2}. On the other hand, the
metric ∼i provides no information on 12.
Theorem 3.15. The following assertions hold.
(1) For i-MDPs we have [i] = [12].
(2) There is a deterministic 2-MDP G with states s, t such that [s 1 t] < [s 12 t].
(3) There is a deterministic 2-MDP G with states s, t such that [s 1 t] > [s 12 t].
Proof. From the definitions of H1 and H12 , restricted to MDPs, where only one player
has a choice of moves, the first assertion follows.
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Figure 4: [s 1 t] = 0 and [s 12 t] = 1. Also, [t 1 s] = 1 and [t 12 s] = 0.
The second and third assertions are proved by the deterministic 2-MDP in Figure 4,
where again [s ≡ t] = 0 and [u ≡ v] = 1. For the second assertion we note that since
d(u, v) = 1, for any choice of k ∈ C(d), player 1 cannot get a higher expectation of k from
state s when compared to state t, because at state s, player 2 always has a move that will
lead to a state yielding a lower k expectation. Therefore, [s 1 t] = 0. Further, for k(v) = 1
and k(u) = 0, which satisfies the constraints on k, we have no moves for either player from
state t, which implies [s 12 t] = 1.
We prove the third assertion by showing that, for the 2-MDP of Figure 4, we have
[t 1 s] > [t 12 s] (which is the third assertion, with s and t exchanged). Note that when
player 2 cooperates, the expectation of any k ∈ C(d) from state s is always at least as much
as the expectation from state t. Thus [t 12 s] = 0. Finally, there exists a k ∈ C(d), with
k(u) = 1 and k(v) = 0, for which [t 1 s] = 1, which completes the proof.
3.8. Computation. We now show that the metrics are computable to any degree of preci-
sion. This follows since the definition of the distance between two states of a given game, as
the least fixpoint of the metric transformer (3.9), can be written as a formula in the theory
of reals, which is decidable [29]. Since the distance between two states may not be rational,
we can only guarantee an approximate computation in general.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the states of G are labeled {s1, . . . , sn}
for some n ∈ IN. The construction is standard (see, e.g., [7]), we recapitulate the main
steps. We denote by R the real-closed field (IR,+, ·, 0, 1,≤) of the reals with addition and
multiplication. An atomic formula is an expression of the form p > 0 or p = 0 where p is
a (possibly) multi-variate polynomial with integer coefficients. An elementary formula is
constructed from atomic formulas by the grammar
ϕ ::= a | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ,
where a is an atomic formula, ∧ denotes conjunction, ∨ denotes disjunction, ¬ denotes
complementation, and ∃ and ∀ denote existential and universal quantification respectively.
We write ϕ→ ϕ′ as shorthand for ¬ϕ∨ϕ′. The semantics of elementary formulas are given
in a standard way [4]. A variable x is free in the formula ϕ if it is not in the scope of a
quantifier ∃x or ∀x. An elementary sentence is a formula with no free variables. The theory
of real-closed fields is decidable [29].
We introduce additional atomic formulas as syntactic sugar: for polynomials p1 and
p2, we write p1 = p2 for p1 − p2 = 0, p1 > p2 for p1 − p2 > 0, and p1 ≥ p2 for p1 − p2 =
0∨ p1− p2 > 0. Also, we write p1 ≤ p2 for p2 ≥ p1 and p1 < p2 for p2 > p1. Let ~x, ~y denote
vectors of variables, where the dimensions of the vectors will be clear from the context. For
∼∈ {=,≤,≥}, we write ~x ∼ ~y for the pointwise ordering, that is, if
∧
i xi ∼ yi. A subset
C ⊆ IRm is definable in R if there exists an elementary formula ϕC(~x) such that for any
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~x0 ∈ IR
m, we have ϕC(~x0) holds in R iff ~x0 ∈ C. A function f : IR
k → IRm is definable in
R if there exists an elementary formula ϕf (~y, ~x) with free variables ~y, ~x such that for all
constants ~y0 ∈ IR
m and ~x0 ∈ IR
k the formula ϕf (~y0, ~x0) is true in R iff ~y0 = f(~x0). We
start with some simple observations about definability.
Lemma 3.16. (a) If functions f1 : IR
k → IRm and f2 : IR
k → IRm are definable in R then
so are the functions
(f1 − f2)(~x) = f1(~x)− f2(~x)
(f1 ⊔ f2)(~x) = f1(~x) ⊔ f2(~x)
(b) If f : IRk+l → IRm is definable in R, and C ⊆ IRk is definable in R, then (supC f) :
IRl → IRm defined as
(sup
C
f)(~y) = sup
~x∈C
f(~x, ~y)
is definable in R.
Proof. For part (a), let ϕ1(~y, ~x) and ϕ2(~y, ~x) be formulas defining f1 and f2 respectively.
Then, f1 − f2 is defined by the formula
∃~z1.∃~z2.(ϕ1(~z1, ~x) ∧ ϕ2(~z2, ~x) ∧ ~y = ~z1 − ~z2),
and f1 ⊔ f2 is defined by the formula
∃~z1.∃~z2.(ϕ1(~z1, ~x) ∧ ϕ2(~z2, ~x) ∧
∧
i
[(~z1,i ≥ ~z2,i ∧ ~yi = ~z1,i) ∨ (~z1,i < ~z2,i ∧ ~yi = ~z2,i)]) .
For part (b), let ϕf (~z, ~x, ~y) define f , where ~x is of dimension k, ~y of dimension l, and ~z
of dimension m, respectively. Let ψC(~x) define C. Then, the following formula with free
variables ~z, ~y (call it ϕ(~z, ~y)) states that ~z is an upper bound of f(~x, ~y) for all ~x ∈ C:
∀~x1.∀~z1.(ψC(~x1) ∧ ϕf (~z1, ~x1, ~y)→ ~z1 ≤ ~z),
and supC f is defined by the formula with free variables ~z, ~y given by:
ϕ(~z, ~y) ∧ ∀~z1.(ϕ(~z1, ~y)→ ~z ≤ ~z1) .
Theorem 3.17. Let G be a game structure and s, t states of G. For all rationals v, and
all ǫ > 0, it is decidable if |[s 1 t]− v| < ǫ and if |[s ≃g t]− v| < ǫ. It is decidable if s 1 t
and if s ≃g t.
Proof. First, we use a result of Weyl [33] that the minmax value of a matrix game with
payoffs in IR can be written as an elementary formula in the theory of real-closed fields.
This implies that for any state s, the function Pre1(~k)(s) is definable in R. Also, for
d ∈M, the set C(d) is definable in R (since conjunctions of linear constraints are definable
in R). Hence, by Lemma 3.16(a) and (b), we have that sup~k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(~k)(s)−Pre1(~k)(t)
)
is definable for any metric d ∈ M, and states s and t of G. By another application of
Lemma 3.16(a), we have that the function
H1(d)(s, t) = (s ≡ t) ⊔ sup
~k∈C(d)
(
Pre1(~k(s)− Pre1(~k)(t)
)
.
is definable for d ∈ M and states s and t of G.
Consider the set of free variables {y(s, t), d(s, t) | s, t ∈ S}, where d is a vector of n2
free variables defining the metric d, and where y is a vector of n2 variables. Let ϕ(y, d) be
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a formula in R, with free variables in the above set, such that ϕ(y, d) is true iff y(s, t) =
H1(d)(s, t) holds for all s, t ∈ S. Then the formula ϕ
∗(y) with free variables y, defined as:
∃d.(ϕ(y, d) ∧ y = d),
defines a fixpoint of H1(d). Finally, the formula ψ(y), given by
ϕ∗(y) ∧ ∀y′.(ϕ∗(y′)→ y ≤ y′) .
defines the least fixpoint of H1 (again, y
′ = {y′(s, t) | s, t ∈ S} is a matrix of n2 variables,
and y ≤ y′ iff y(s, t) ≤ y′(s, t) for all s, t ∈ S). Thus, ψ(y) is true iff y(s, t) = [s 1 t] for all
s, t ∈ S.
While this shows that [s 1 t] is algebraic, there are game structures G with all transi-
tion probabilities being rational, but with states s and t of G such that [s 1 t] is irrational.
So, we use the formula above to approximate the value of [s 1 t] to within a constant ǫ.
For states s, t and rationals v, ǫ, we have that |[s 1 t]−v| < ǫ iff ∃y.(ψ(y)∧|y(s, t)−v| < ǫ)
is valid, and this can be decided since R is decidable.
A similar construction shows that the question whether |[s ≃g t]− v| < ǫ, is decidable
for states s, t and rationals v, ǫ: we ensure that y is a symmetric fixpoint by conjoining to
ϕ∗(y) constraints y(s, t) = y(t, s) for all states s, t.
If the formula ∃y.(ψ(y) ∧ y(s, t) = 0), where we assert that the distance between s and
t is zero, is valid, we can conclude that s 1 t. This implies that the relation s 1 t is
decidable for any game structure G and states s and t of G. A similar construction for ≃g
shows that the relation s ≃g t is also decidable for any game structure G and states s, t of
G.
4. Discussion
Our derivation of i and ≃g, for i ∈ {1, 2}, as kernels of metrics, seems somewhat
abstruse: most equivalence or similarity relations have been defined, after all, without
resorting to metrics. We now point out how a generalization of the usual definitions [25, 2,
9, 10], suggested in [6, 19], fails to produce the “right” relations. Furthermore, the flawed
relations obtained as a generalization of [25, 2, 9, 10] are no simpler than our definitions,
based on kernel metrics. Thus, our study of game relations as kernels of metrics carries no
drawbacks in terms of leading to more complicated definitions. Indeed, we believe that the
metric approach is the superior one for the study of game relations.
We outline the flawed generalization of [25, 2, 9, 10] as proposed in [6, 19], explaining
why it would seem a natural generalization. The alternating simulation of [2] is defined over
deterministic game structures. Player-i alternating simulation, for i ∈ {1, 2}, is the largest
relation R satisfying the following conditions, for all states s, t ∈ S: s R t implies s ≡ t and
∀xi ∈ Γi(s) . ∃yi ∈ Γi(t) . ∀y∼i ∈ Γ∼i(t) . ∃x∼i ∈ Γ∼i(s) . τ(s, x1, x2)R τ(t, y1, y2).
The MDP relations of [25], later extended to metrics by [9, 10], rely on the fixpoint
(3.2), where sup plays the role of ∀, inf plays the role of ∃, and R is replaced by distribution
equality modulo R, or ⊑R. This strongly suggests — incorrectly — that equivalences
for general games (probabilistic, concurrent games) can be obtained by taking the double
quantifier alternation ∀∃∀∃ in the definition of alternating simulation, changing all ∀ into
sup, all ∃ into inf, and replacing R by ⊑R. The definition that would result is as follows.
We parametrize the new relations by a player i ∈ {1, 2}, as well as by whether mixed moves
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or only pure moves are allowed. For a relation R ⊆ S × S, for M ∈ {Γ,D}, for all s, t ∈ S
and i ∈ {1, 2} consider the following conditions:
• (loc) s R t implies s ≡ t.
• (M-i-altsim) s R t implies
∀xi ∈Mi(s) . ∃yi ∈Mi(t) . ∀y∼i ∈M∼i(t) . ∃x∼i ∈M∼i(s) . δ(s, x1, x2) ⊑R δ(t, y1, y2);
We then define the following relations:
• For i ∈ {1, 2} and M ∈ {Γ,D}, player-i M -alternating simulation ⊑Mi is the largest
relation that satisfies (loc) and (M -i-altsim).
• For i ∈ {1, 2} and M ∈ {Γ,D}, player-i M -alternating bisimulation ∼=Mi is the largest
symmetrical relation that satisfies (loc) and (M -i-altsim).
Over deterministic game structures, the definitions of ⊑Γi and
∼=Γi coincide with the alternat-
ing simulation and bisimulation relations of [2]. In fact, ⊑Γi and
∼=Γi capture the deterministic
semantics of qµ, and thus in some sense generalize the results of [2] to probabilistic game
structures.
Theorem 4.1. For any game structure G and states s, t of G, the following assertions hold:
(1) s ∼=Γi t iff [[ϕ]]
Γ(s) = [[ϕ]]Γ(t) holds for every ϕ ∈ qµi.
(2) s ⊑Γi t iff [[ϕ]]
Γ(s) ≤ [[ϕ]]Γ(t) holds for every ϕ ∈ qµ+i .
The following lemma states that ⊑Di and
∼=Di are the kernels of [⊑i] and [
∼=i], connecting
thus the result of combining the definitions of [25] and [2] with a posteriori metrics.
Lemma 4.2. For all game structures G, all players i ∈ {1, 2}, and all states s, t of G, we
have s ⊑Di t iff [s ⊑i t] = 0, and s
∼=Di t iff [s
∼=i t] = 0.
We are now in a position to prove that neither the Γ-relations not the D-relations
are the “canonical” relations on general concurrent games, since neither characterizes [[qµ]].
In particular, the D-relations are too fine, and the Γ-relations are incomparable with the
relations i and ≃g, for i ∈ {1, 2}. We prove these negative results first for the D-relations.
They follow from Theorem 3.7 and 3.11.
Theorem 4.3. The following assertions hold:
(1) For all game structures G, all states s, t of G, and all i ∈ {1, 2}, we have that s ⊑Di t
implies s i t, and s ∼=
D
i t implies s ≃i t.
(2) There is a game structure G, and states s, t of G, such that s i t but s 6⊑
D
i t.
(3) There is a game structure G, and states s, t of G, such that [[ϕ]](s) = [[ϕ]](t) for all
ϕ ∈ qµ, but s 6∼=Di t for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
We now turn our attention to the Γ-relations, showing that they are incomparable with
i and ≃g, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Theorem 4.4. The following assertions hold:
(1) There exists a deterministic game structure G and states s, t of G such that s ⊑Γ1 t but
s 61 t, and s ∼=
Γ
1 t but s 6≃g t.
(2) There exists a turn-based game structure G and states s, t of G such that s 1 t but
s 6⊑Γ1 t. and s ≃g t but s 6
∼=Γ1 t.
Proof. The first assertion is proved via the deterministic game in Figure 5, where [s ≡ t] = 0
and [u ≡ v] = 1 and Γ1(s) = Γ2(s) = {a, b} and Γ1(t) = Γ2(t) = {a, b, c}. In the figure, we
use the variables x and y to represent moves: if player 1 and player 2 moves coincide, u is
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v
Figure 5: s ⊑Γ1 t but s 61 t and s
∼=Γ1 t but s 6≃g t
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Figure 6: s 1 t but s 6⊑
Γ
1 t and s ≃g t but s 6
∼=Γ1 t.
the successor state, otherwise it is v. Thus, the game from s is the usual “penny-matching”
game; the game from t is a version of “penny-matching” with 3-sided pennies.
It can be seen that s ⊑Γ1 t. On the other hand, we have s 61 t. Indeed, from state
s, by playing both a and b with probability 12 , player 1 can ensure that the probability
of a transition to u is 12 . On the other hand, from state t, player 1 can achieve at most
probability 13 of reaching u (this maximal probability is achieved by playing all of a, b, c
with probability 13). The result then follows using Theorem 3.11.
The second assertion is proved via the game in Figure 6. We have s 6⊑Γ1 t: clearly,
player-1’s move c at state s cannot be mimicked at t when the game is restricted to pure
moves. On the other hand, we have s 1 t: since the move c at s can be imitated via the
mixed move that plays both a and b at t with probability 12 each, all qµ formulas have the
same value, under [[·]], at s and t, and the result follows once more using Theorem 3.11.
Finally, we remark that, in view of Theorem 3.12, the definitions of the relations i
and ≃g for i ∈ {1, 2} are no more complex than the definitions of ⊑
D
1 , ⊑
Γ
1 ,
∼=D1 , and
∼=Γ1 .
5. Conclusions
We have introduced the metrics and relations that constitute the natural generalizations
of simulation and bisimulation to stochastic games on graphs. These relations and metrics
are tight, in the sense that the distance between two states is equal to the maximum
difference in value that properties of the quantitative µ-calculus can assume at the two
states: in other words, the relations characterize quantitative µ-calculus, in the same way
in which ordinary bisimulation characterizes µ-calculus. The paper also provided a full
picture of the connection between the new metrics and relations, and the relations previously
considered for games.
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The main point left open by the paper concerns the algorithms for the computation of
the relations and metrics. The algorithms we provided rely on the decidability of the theory
of reals; it is an open question whether more efficient, and more direct, algorithms exist,
for the metrics or at least for the relations.
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